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Articles 
STEALTH TORT REFORM 
Sandra F. Gavin∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The widespread call for “tort reform” over the past three decades is a 
calculated product of political rhetoric operating outside of the common 
law.  The very phrase “tort reform” functions as a political symbol “in 
which both sides engage in lobbying and propaganda that contains some 
element of real problems, half-truths, and outright distortions.”1  “Tort 
crisis,” “litigation lottery,” “lawsuit hell,” “mad dog lawyers,” “runaway 
juries,” “junk science,” “tort tax,”–all these phrases have been used to 
describe the present state of our civil tort system.  Considerable 
scholarship has been directed toward debunking the basis for claims 
made by the tort reformers.  For instance, Professor Marc Galanter 
published many law review articles aiming to expose the large gap 
between the claims and the facts underlying the tort reform rhetoric 
during the 1990s;2 scholarly experts have documented that plaintiffs 
rarely win large judgments against corporations for defective products;3 
the volume of products liability cases and medical malpractice cases 
                                                 
∗Advocacy Program Director and Visiting Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law, 
Camden, New Jersey.  Prior to joining the faculty Professor Gavin was employed as a 
public defender, defense litigation associate, and principal in a plaintiffs’ litigation firm. 
1 NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL  MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE 
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 270 
(1995) (stating that both sides cloak themselves in American values and claim that the other 
side threatens democracy and the American way of life).  See also F. Patrick Hubbard, The 
Physicians’ Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the 
Symbolic Importance of “Tort Reform”, 23 GA. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1989) (providing a review of 
the opposing camps and the importance of symbolic issues in the general “tort reform” 
debate). 
2 See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells us About 
Decision Making by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (Robert E. 
Litan ed., 1993); Marc Galanter, Real World Tort: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 
(1996); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Michael 
J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System–And Why 
Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992). 
3 See, e.g., AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO 
WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985) (this early study used information from 
published jury reports in Cook County to compile the first, systematic statistical database 
on civil jury trials and verdicts); STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE 
POLITICS OF REFORM  (1995) (utilizing  broader geographic data bases); Brian J. Ostrom et al., 
A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233 (1996) 
(drawing on the database maintained by the National Center for State Courts). 
Gavin: Stealth Tort Reform
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
432 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
have not increased significantly;4 and, juries generally produce 
reasonable outcomes.5 
However, what has been called the “realist account”6 of the tort 
reform movement is not the subject of this Article other than to note that 
such scholarship has not stopped the movement’s proliferation.7  While 
such realist sociolegal scholars rely heavily on statistical studies to 
document how the tort reform campaign “radically distort[s] empirical 
truth about legal practice[,]”8 it is generally recognized that the rhetoric 
of the reform movement itself plays a major role in shaping public 
opinion and in thwarting further judicial expansion of the doctrine.9  
                                                 
4 See generally DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3. 
5 See id. (concluding that juries perform their functions reasonably well). 
6 WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND 
THE LITIGATION CRISIS 7-8 (William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 2004). 
7 This Article is not concerned with the empirical battle in the sense of disproving the 
tort reformers; instead I take the position that, in the absence of studies allowing the 
conclusion that the reformers have drawn, common law should prevail.  See, e.g., DANIELS 
& MARTIN, supra note 3, at 58, concluding: 
The rhetoric’s critics argue there is a substantial gap between the 
image portrayed in the rhetoric and what the best available evidence 
can tell us. This gap is much more a result of the political marketing of 
ideas tied to that political struggle over which image of the civil justice 
system will govern policy than it is a result of the limitations of the 
empirical literature.  Viewed in this light, the interesting and troubling 
issue is not simply the fact that there is a substantial distance between 
rhetoric and empirical evidence, but that the image portrayed is 
accepted regardless of its veracity. 
Id.  See also Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about the Civil Justice 
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 721-22 (1998).  Galanter comments: 
One of the accomplishments of law and society scholarship has been to 
criticize and refute the body of belief I have called the jaundiced view.  
Contrary to our expectations, error did not retire from the field; it 
proved quite resilient.  The kind of knowledge that law and society 
scholars proffered has had some impact on courts and legislatures, but 
it has not carried the day in wider popular or political forums. 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
8 HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 6, at 8 (emphasis in original).  See generally CARL T. 
BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, 
AND THE COMMON LAW (2001); JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW, THE CONSERVATIVE 
CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW (2004); HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 6, at 
73-110; Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution In 
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, (1991); Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Barry, Is 
the Tort System in Crisis?  New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (1999); Robert S. Peck 
et al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397 (2000). 
9 See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 8, at 792 (“More important than the reality of 
an insurance crisis is whether the American public generally perceived an insurance crisis 
and whether the perception was successfully tied to the products liability system in a way 
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These contemporary reformers, often funded by the constituents seeking 
to profit from their campaign, have succeeded masterfully in swaying 
public opinion as they seek to roll back the common law.10 
When the critics of our common law tort system fail to achieve all 
the reform legislation they seek, they are increasingly successful in 
winning tort reform by stealth–they covertly manipulate our civil justice 
system and perhaps our perception of what is socially just. 
II.  THE “WHY” BEHIND THE “ORIGINAL TORT REFORM” 
Strict liability in tort evolved during a time when three people were 
killed every hour of every day from household hazards: color television 
sets routinely caught fire; unglazed glass doors and walls sliced through 
vital organs causing disfigurement, paralysis, or death; hot water 
vaporizers reached scalding temperatures producing third-degree burns; 
furniture polish produced an epidemic of chemical pneumonia; 
dishwasher detergents contained pH values similar to values found in 
lye; circular saws maimed thousands; and, rotary lawn mowers routinely 
                                                                                                             
that could have reshaped opinion.  It was; public perception of a 1980s insurance crisis is 
undeniable”). 
10 See, e.g., FEINMAN,  supra note 8, at 174-76 (noting the various coalitions of drug, oil, 
tobacco, insurance, chemical corporations, and trade associations funding the 
“conservative attack on the common law[,]” including the American Tort Reform 
Association (“ATRA”), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Manhattan Institute); 
HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 6, at 45-49 (under the heading, “Financing Reform 
Advocacy”); Stephanie Mencimer, False Alarm: How the Media Helps the Insurance Industry 
and the GOP Promote the Myth of America’s “Lawsuit Crisis”, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 2004, at 
18.  Mencimer documents the funding by business groups behind the media’s “We All Pay 
the Price” pro-reform campaign, and states: 
One of the most influential of those groups is the Manhattan Institute, 
founded by the late CIA director William Casey.  In 1986, the institute 
created its Project on Civil Justice Reform with funding from all the 
same insurance companies who’d been responsible for circulating 
bogus lawsuit horror stories.  The project was targeted specifically at 
journalists.  In a 1992 memo, institute president William Hammett 
explained the strategy, for molding reporters into a “pro-tort reform” 
position, “Journalists need copy, and it’s an established fact that over 
time they’ll ‘bend’ in the direction in which it flows.  For that reason, it 
is imperative that a steady stream of understandable research, analysis, 
and commentary supporting the need for liability reform be produced. 
If sometime during the present decade, a consensus emerges in favor 
of serious judicial reform, it will be because millions of minds have 
been changed, and only one institution is powerful enough to bring 
that about: the combined force of the nation’s print and broadcast 
media, the most potent instrument for public education–or 
miseducation–in existence. 
Id. 
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sent a parade of patients holding bloody towels around lacerated or 
amputated hands or feet to emergency rooms across the United States 
every spring.11  In 1970, the President’s Commission on Product Safety 
reported that some twenty million Americans were injured each year as 
a result of incidents connected with consumer products.12  An additional 
seven million injuries were reportedly connected to industrial products.13  
Men, women, and children suffered devastating injuries from unsafe 
products and neither negligence law nor governmental regulation was 
up to the task of promoting safer products.14  Thus, before assessing the 
validity of the contemporary tort reform movement, it is helpful to 
revisit the “why” behind modern products liability in tort. 
Nineteenth century tort law protected the interests of defendants in 
general as well as particular categories of defendants.15  The principle of 
caveat emptor as well as the doctrines of negligence and contract 
protected the merchants, reflecting a “new nation’s devotion to 
individualism and free enterprise.”16  The fault-based approach to 
liability for injuries caused by products was a reflection of the nature of 
society at large in the preindustrial era, when consumer transactions 
generally took place face-to-face; it also coincided with laissez faire 
political philosophy and principles of individualism that were prevalent 
at the time.17  An injured consumer could only recover damages if it 
could be proved that the merchant or manufacturer engaged in 
unreasonable conduct.  “Emerging industries and enterprises flourished 
under the protective cover of negligence principles.”18  Obstacles to 
                                                 
11 See U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, ANN. REP., ch. 2, 9-34 (1990). 
12 See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY (1970), LIB. 
CONG. NO. 76-600753. 
13 See THE PRESIDENT’S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1972). 
14 See Alvin S. Weinstein et al., Products Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 
DUQ. L. REV. 425, 462 (1974) (an early study of “new federal agencies for both occupational 
safety and product safety” and their effect on product safety, concluding that “these 
mechanisms [federal agencies], apart from the legal system, afford an incomplete basis for 
adjudication of legal and economic responsibility”). 
15 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-87 (2d ed. 1985); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 67-108 (1977); G. 
EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 61-62 (1980). 
16 See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY 19 (4th ed. 2004) (for a 
history of the doctrine in early products liability law). 
17 See 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 12.3 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter THE 
LAW OF TORTS] (noting that during the Industrial Revolution, society firmly believed that 
newly emerging industries deserved protection to promote expansion and that they would 
survive only if they were not burdened with all the losses that they actually caused.  Fault-
based negligence principles promoted this social policy). 
18 John Vargo, Strict Liability for Products: An Achievable Goal, 24 IND. L. REV. 1197, 1201 
(1991). 
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recovery developed from the often confusing overlap of contract and tort 
theory applied to actions involving consumers injured by products.19 
Social values as well as economic policies supported the pro-
merchant era, and it was not until the middle of the twentieth century 
that protectionist attitudes toward product defendants changed.20  
Simultaneously, the recognition that negligence and contract principles 
afforded the consuming public insufficient protection from product 
related injuries emerged.21  In his concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Company, Justice Traynor asserted that, while negligence was not 
proven, it was unnecessary to prove, and further argued that “public 
policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most 
effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective 
products that reach the market.”22  Thus, “the original tort reform” 
promoted social justice and product safety, evolving to rectify the harsh 
doctrines that barred consumers from recovery.23 
While this reform movement had its theoretical underpinnings in the 
doctrine of enterprise liability as set forth by Justice Traynor in Escola,24 it 
took an additional two decades for this theory to supplant contract 
principles as a basis upon which to recover damages for injuries and to 
control sources of products injury.25  Twenty years after Escola, a new era 
                                                 
19 See generally Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence 
[to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980) (for a summary of 
the contract-to-tort approach underlying products liability). 
20 See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 17, at § 28.27 (commenting on the social justice 
underpinning; of product liability doctrine, it notes, “[p]ublic policy goals undergirding the 
societal commitment to a notion of expansive manufacturer liability for defective products 
could not be effectively realized in view of the limitations inherent in negligence or implied 
warranty.”); Birnbaum, supra note 19, at 596; Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of 
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965). 
21 Vargo, supra note 18, at 1202. 
22 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463 (Cal. 1944). 
23 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384 (1960) (wherein the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, prior to Greenman, eliminated the privity requirement in a breach of 
implied warranty action, holding that the manufacturer’s obligation is not grounded in the 
contract law of sales, but “upon ‘the demands of social justice.’”). 
24 Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 453. 
25 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (N.Y. 1916).  Judge Cardozo allowed 
Mr. MacPherson, who purchased his Buick from a local dealer not in privity with the 
manufacturer, recovery in negligence despite the contractual privity defense.  Id.  Similar 
cases were in the minority and limited to situations where it could be shown that the 
purchaser or intervening seller would not inspect for defects.  Id.  Although MacPherson 
was decided in 1916, it may be read today as a precursor of the strict liability standard 
enunciated later by Justice Traynor in Escola and Greenman.  Decades would intervene 
while the contract approach generally prevailed.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort 
Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 653 (1990) (“Enterprise liability, which posits that a business or 
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for consumers commenced when, writing for a unanimous court in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., Justice Traynor rejected warranty’s 
“timely notice” obstacle to the consumer claim, announcing that public 
policy demanded that the burden of accidental injury be placed on the 
entities who marketed them.26  Strict liability in tort was born, and 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402(A) followed in 1965 providing: 
[T]he public has the right to and does expect, in the case 
of products which it needs and for which it is forced to 
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand 
behind their goods; that public policy demands that the 
burden of accidental injuries caused by products 
intended for consumption be placed upon those who 
market them, and be treated as a cost of production 
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and 
that the consumer of such products is entitled to the 
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and 
the proper persons to afford it are those who market the 
products. 27 
Thus, strict products liability evolved at common law to implement 
an important social policy: to provide greater protection to the injured 
consumer than either contract or negligence law.  Defendant 
manufacturers and sellers could no longer hide beneath the protective 
cloak of traditional contract or negligence principles.  Greenman and 
Section 402(A) heralded the “original tort reform,” and the common law 
contours of this legal doctrine developed rapidly over the next two 
decades.  Legal duties more stringent than those imposed by 
government regulation developed to protect consumers.28 
                                                                                                             
activity should bear the costs of the harm it causes, provided the major impetus for the shift 
from a negligence theory to a strict liability theory in products liability.”) (citations 
omitted); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (tracing the history 
of the doctrine as part of a conference addressing critical issues in tort reform at Yale Law 
School in 1984). 
26 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63 (1963) (Judge Traynor 
wrote, “[t]he purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from 
defective products are borne by the manufacturers . . . rather than by the injured persons 
who are powerless to protect themselves.”). 
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A  cmt. c. (1965). 
28 See, e.g., BOGUS, supra note 8, at 150-51 (arguing that while asbestos caused 170,000 
deaths, the Environmental Protection Agency was never able to ban it, and lawsuits forced 
it from the marketplace); Birnbaum, supra note 19, at 593; Weinstein,  supra note 14, at 462-
63. 
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Deterrence is a major function of tort law,29 and the doctrine of 
products liability benefits consumers.30  “Primary among these benefits is 
the deterrent effect that it has on negligent behavior and unsafe 
products.”31  As Judge Posner has noted, “although there has been little 
systematic study of the deterrent effect of tort law, what empirical 
evidence there is indicates that tort law . . . deters.”32  Even those who 
question the level of deterrence in tort law concede that it delivers a 
“moderate amount of deterrence.”33  A primary social benefit of products 
liability tort law is deterrence to substandard conduct, or, put another 
way, an “incentive to beneficial conduct.”34  While the threat of liability 
                                                 
29 Webb v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d. 343, 346 (Vt. 1996) (stating that strict 
liability “protects the consumer . . . by creating an incentive for manufacturers to produce 
safe products, . . . or as other courts have stated, a deterrence to producing unreasonably 
dangerous products.”) (citation omitted); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 111 (N.J. 
1996) (“[t]he goal of deterrence, acknowledged generally to be part of tort law, is especially 
important in the field of products-liability law . . . .[T]his state has a strong interest in 
encouraging the manufacture and distribution of safe products . . . and, conversely, in 
deterring the manufacture and distribution of unsafe products  . . . ”); West Am. Ins. Co. v. 
Oberding, 451 A.2d 239, 242-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (noting the deterrent effect caused by 
product liability suits); Frank J. Vandall, Our Product Liability System: An Efficient Solution to 
a Complex Problem, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 703, 710  (1987-1988) (“. . .  our concept of strict 
liability has developed over time to make it easier for consumers to obtain compensation 
from manufacturers or sellers when injured by their products”). 
30 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 25-26 (5th ed. 
1984). 
31 Peck et al., supra note 8, at 436. 
32 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
10 (1987). 
33 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 443-44 (1994).  Schwartz states: 
Yet between the economists’ strong claim that tort law systematically 
deters and the critics’response that tort law rarely if ever deters lies an 
intermediate position: tort law, while not as effective as economic 
models suggest, may still be somewhat successful in achieving its 
stated deterrence goals 
. . . 
Nevertheless, even if tort law is only moderately successful in 
deterring negligent conduct, this success has been largely 
unacknowledged by the realist critics and has a major bearing on any 
public-policy review of the tort system. 
Id.  See also Anita Johnson, Products Liability “Reform”: A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L. 
REV. 677, 692 (1978) (stating “[t]he breadth and flexibility of the common law have 
permitted it to effectively discipline the harmful effects of technology.”); Joseph A. Page, 
Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO L.J. 649, 681-89 (1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: 
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)  (responding to Huber’s criticism of 
the tort system “for ignoring safety disincentives that might flow from the imposition of 
liability”)). 
34 M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the 
Lenses of Corrective Justice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017, 1034 (1998). 
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may not be the sole reason behind safety innovations, scholars note that 
it plays an important interactive role.35  Companies exhibiting “callous 
disregard for consumer safety have been hauled into court,” resulting in 
safer consumer products.36  Specifically, products liability doctrine 
promotes safer product containers, safer product handling,37 and, in 
particular, safer automobiles38 and pharmaceuticals.39  In 1983, the Rand 
Institute studied the “serious public policy problem, namely the 
manufacture of products that may have been unreasonably dangerous to 
their users[,]” to determine what external pressures had the greatest 
influence on promoting products safety and concluded,  “[o]f all the 
various external social pressures, product liability has the greatest 
influence on product design decisions.”40 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Safety, in PETER W. HUBER & 
ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY AND SAFETY ON 
INNOVATION 120, 180 (1991) (summarizing safety innovations in the automotive industry, 
“[t]he case studies establish that vehicle safety is enhanced by the interplay of consumer 
demand, regulation, liability, and professional responsibility.”); Schwartz, supra note 33, at 
384-85. 
36 Peck et al., supra note 8, at 438 (reviewing court cases involving the Ford Pinto and 
Chrysler minivan and documenting the companies’ “callous disregard for consumer 
safety”); Johnson, supra note 33, at 677.  Johnson concludes: 
Private personal injury lawsuits can help to control exposure to unsafe 
products in addition to compensating injured consumers and workers.  
Court decisions in these suits have played an active role in developing 
manufacturers’ legal duties to the public and in providing incentives 
for manufacturers to improve products and thereby avert future 
litigable injuries. 
Id.  See also Marc S. Moller & Paul Indig, Products Liability Law Revisited: A Realistic 
Perspective, 31 TORT & INS. L. J. 879, 881 (1996) (“Fortunately, and perhaps as a result of the 
products liability movement of the 1960s and early 1970s, most American consumer 
products are the safest available in the world.”); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding 
Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 451 n.107 (1979) (quoting a newspaper article 
describing the redesign of a vaporizer found to be defectively designed in McCormack v. 
Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 497 (1967)). 
37 Johnson, supra note 33, at 677 n.2 (citing a series of cases forcing safer products). 
38 See Graham, supra note 35, at 180 (citing a series of cases involving automobile safety); 
Peck et al., supra note 8, at 437 (“One industry in which consumers have clearly seen safety 
benefits derived from the tort system is the automobile industry.”). 
39 See generally Judith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, in THE 
LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 35, at 293 (reporting that products liability laws and litigation 
have a “marginal effect” on prescription drug safety, but pharmaceutical manufacturers 
recognize that they can take steps to further contain risks and increase the safer use of their 
prescription products). 
40 GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS, CORPORATE RESPONSES TO 
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION iii-viii (1983) (based on a study of large 
manufacturers of consumer products which developed corporate level safety offices after 
the 1960s). 
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Collectively, the doctrinal “why” behind the original tort reform 
reveals much about the social justice theory fueling the doctrine.41  While 
a rapid proliferation of unsafe products during the 1970s and early 1980s 
provided the social impetus for strict products liability in tort, the 
common law played a pivotal role in refining a doctrine providing 
incentives for manufacturers to improve the safety of their products.  
Broader civil justice goals of product safety and court access were major 
forces in development of the law.42  An early doctrinal basis for 
promoting these goals was enterprise liability,43 and scholars debated 
and disagreed on the “dominant” source of law for the dramatic changes 
taking place.44  Was the dominant strand risk-spreading or risk-
deterrence?45  If “strict liability” meant something less than absolute 
responsibility and pure insurance, where did one draw the line?46 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Madden, supra note 34, at 1096 (“[E]fficiency and corrective justice principles 
operate and will continue to operate in a beneficial symbiosis, each a check and a balance 
upon the other,  with each as a necessary, but neither a sufficient, rationale for modern 
accident law objectives.”). 
42 Johnson, supra note 33, at 692. 
43 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1960).  The majority of the 
California Supreme Court utilized a somewhat tortured negligence approach to allow 
recovery for injury caused by an exploding Coke bottle.  Id.  In his concurrence, Judge 
Traynor set forth a more direct path to recovery, stating: 
[I]t should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute 
liability when an article that he has placed on the market . . . proves to 
have a defect that causes injury to human beings . . . . [P]ublic policy 
demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively 
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products 
that reach the market. 
Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
44 See, e.g., Critical Issues in Tort Law Reform: A Search for Principles, A Conference Sponsored 
by Yale Law School, 14  J. LEGAL STUD. 459 (1985) [hereinafter Critical Issues in Tort Reform] 
(containing papers exploring the foundations of modern tort law presented at the 
conference); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to 
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960) (providing a status report on the original 
“assault upon the citadel of privity”); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for 
Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825 (1973). 
45 Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort 
Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both 
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1810 (1997) (“Currently there are two 
major camps of tort scholars.  One understands tort liability as an instrument aimed largely 
at the goal of deterrence, commonly explained within the framework of economics.  The 
other looks at tort law as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties.”).  But 
see Priest, supra note 25, stating: 
In my view, the contours of modern tort law reflect a single coherent 
conception of the best method to control the sources of product-related 
injuries.  This conception, which its proponents called the theory of 
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However, while the debate raged concerning the parameters of the 
doctrine, no scholar seriously contested the legitimacy of promoting 
product safety or deterring substandard conduct.  During this period of 
rapid doctrinal expansion, inquiry into its essential nature and a search 
for its proper limits continued.  Professor John Wade articulated his 
seven factors;47 Professor James Henderson ruminated on the 
appropriate limits of manufacturer liability;48 Professor David Owen 
critiqued a catalogue of rationales behind strict products liability.49  An 
entire volume of The Journal of Legal Studies serves as a compendium of 
the search for the intellectual foundations of tort law in general, and in 
particular, for “strict liability in tort.”50 
Despite debate among academics, court after court accepted the 
doctrine of enterprise liability.51  This doctrinal expansion took place in 
state and federal courts across the country under the guidance of the 
judiciary.  While this Article does not advance the choice of one correct 
theory upon which to ground product liability law, it opines that the fact 
that the doctrine has been the subject of great debate among scholars and 
the fact that it expands and contracts is a reflection that the common law 
is alive and well and doing what it is supposed to do.  The scope and 
volume of the debate indicates to this author that the experiential nature 
of the common law process worked well during the evolution of the 
original tort reform and that it developed exponentially, adjusting to 
changing societal norms and fostering the broad civil justice goal of 
promoting safe products. 
                                                                                                             
enterprise liability, provides in its simplest form that business 
enterprises ought to be responsible for losses resulting from products 
they introduce into commerce. 
Id. at 463 (citations omitted). 
46 David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980). 
47 See Wade, supra note 44, at 837-38. 
48 See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 8. 
49 See Owen, supra note 16, at 529. 
50 See Critical Issues in Tort Reform, supra note 44, at 459. 
51 See THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 17 (listing cases advocating risk distribution ).  See, 
e.g., Priest, supra note 25, at 501; Madden, supra note 41, at 1034-55.  Madden remarks that: 
[t]he decisional law with virtually no dissent repeats a deterrence role 
in accident law, without specifically assigning this result to the 
operation of either corrective justice or efficiency principles. When 
those disputing the vitality of a deterrence role achieved by decisions 
tracking corrective justice principles are largely academicians, I am 
inclined to side with the conclusions of judges who try the cases and 
read the records. 
Id. at 1034-55 (emphasis added). 
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Given the unprecedented rapid proliferation of pro-consumer case 
law during the period of doctrinal expansion for strict liability in tort, it 
was not surprising that a pro-manufacturer backlash would ensue, and it 
did so under the skewed and misleading label of “tort reform.”  
However, this movement has taken place separate and apart from the 
common law and appears to be based on social policies antithetical to the 
policies underlying the “original tort reform.”52  Contemporary 
reformers have taken their cause to the court of public opinion and the 
very phrase “tort reform” has become a political tool used to manipulate 
the judiciary and the public at large by depicting our tort system as “a 
Mad Hatter world of avaricious lawyers, fluff-headed jurors, and 
permissive judges . . . ”53  The lexical meaning of the phrase reveals that 
its use has extended beyond its historical meaning as reflected in the 
language of 402(A) of Restatement (Second) of Torts.  The phrase now 
seems to serve as short hand rhetoric for any perceived attempt by 
injured consumers to invoke tort law.54 
Stealth tort reform operates to manipulate public perception about 
the state of the law without regard to truth or logic.  It is not directed 
toward promoting social justice other than to “change perceptions of 
what the common good ought to be.”55  Most importantly, stealth tort 
reform is not interested in truth; unlike the common law, it persuades 
through assertive rhetoric and not through the give-and-take of orderly 
proof and argument, but through manipulation of images and ideas. 
                                                 
52 See Page, supra note 25, at 654-55.  Page states: 
As history suggests, the old tort reform constituted but one swing of a 
pendulum that later began to reverse itself in the wake of the crises of 
the 1970s and 1980s.  Thus, construed most favorably, the “new tort 
reform” has become an effort to eliminate alleged excesses perpetrated 
by the old tort reform and to restore equilibrium to the system. 
Despite their apparent similarities, there is an important difference 
between the old and the new tort reform.  The former derived 
inspiration and major impetus from the ideas of scholars and had its 
primary influence on the courts.  The latter is fueled by the economic 
self-interest of those who perceive themselves as adversely affected by 
the tort system.  In essence, the new tort reform is a political attack on 
tort law in the legislative arena. 
Id. 
53 BOGUS, supra note 8, at 4. 
54 See generally William H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 9 (1996) (dissecting the use of language as rhetoric). 
55 Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Reflections on Twenty Years 
of Product Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV 1019, 1050 (2000). 
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III.  ASSERTIVE RHETORIC AND CONTEMPORARY TORT REFORM 
Our common law is designed to “seek the truth” by an orderly 
presentation of evidence in a court of law pursuant to rules developed 
over decades to ensure that all sides have a fair opportunity to be heard.  
Juries perform the function of factfinder, which is “to weigh the evidence 
and decide the truth of the matter.”56  The common law places innate 
trust in the reasoned logic of citizen jurors.  Reason, not passion, is the 
bulwark of our judicial system.  However, “assertive rhetoric” is central 
to understanding the clandestine nature of the strategies used to 
manipulate public opinion while circumventing thoughtful application 
of the common law.  In addressing the nature of such rhetoric, F. G. 
Bailey, in The Tactical Uses of Passion, An Essay on Power, Reason and 
Reality, discusses and dissects various modalities of persuasion and 
posits that our American culture champions persuasion based on reason 
over persuasion resulting from passion when seeking to find truth.57  
With regard to the modality of persuasion through passion he writes: 
The . . . (direct use of passions) seeks to eliminate the 
mind and the critical faculties.  It provokes feeling rather 
than thought.  It is employed when the persuader 
suspects that the logical steps in the argument will not 
survive critical examination, or when he can find no 
shared value that will serve as the premise for an 
argument by reason.  The appeal to emotion may be 
designed either to create such a shared value or to 
provoke a direct connection between feeling and action 
without the intervention of mind and its capacities for 
criticism.58 
“Assertive rhetoric” is the term Bailey uses to describe a passion-
based method of persuasion “directed to ensuring that only one side of 
the question gets a hearing.”59  The reformers have masterfully engaged 
in a public relations campaign of assertive rhetoric which begs the 
question and is designed to ensure that “only” their side of the question 
“gets a hearing.”  Their campaign has been assimilated into our culture 
to the point that very few recall the social and moral justifications for the 
                                                 
56 Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: 
Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda Building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 274 (1989). 
57 See BAILEY, THE TACTICAL USES OF PASSION: AN ESSAY ON POWER, REASON, AND 
REALITY (1983). 
58 Id. at 23. 
59 Id. at 124. 
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original tort reform of the 1960s and 1970s.60  In his chapter, “The 
Rhetoric of Assertion,” Bailey summarizes: 
In short, assertive rhetoric inescapably must proceed by 
begging the question: by simple assertion of the 
correctness of one answer to the question at issue.  There 
is no other way of arguing about intrinsic values, for 
these are ends in themselves.  The speaker asserts a truth 
by identifying the true believers who “happen” to be 
those who believe that truth.  Accordingly, it is 
inappropriate to ask whether an argument advanced in 
this form of rhetoric is valid or invalid, and to test it by 
the rules of logic.  The proper question to ask about 
assertive rhetoric concerns effectiveness.  It is intended 
to provoke attitudes of approval or disapproval, to 
compel assent, to bring people over to one’s own side.61 
Bailey focuses on the rhetorical devices that are directed toward 
ensuring that only one side of the question gets a hearing, including: 
ethos, the invocation of authority, the uses of fright, the focus on 
personalities, and the significance of the vivid example.62  These 
heresthetical devises eliminate logic by structuring the dialogue (or lack 
thereof) so people will want to join the campaign or will feel forced by 
circumstances to align with the argument without question.63  While 
“logic” is concerned with the truth value of language, “rhetoric” and 
“heresthetic” are concerned with the persuasion and strategy value;64 the 
                                                 
60 See HALTOM& MCCANN, supra note 6. 
61 See BAILEY, supra note 57, at 135-36. 
62 See BAILEY, supra note 57, at 123-43. 
63 RIKER, supra note 54. Writing in the political science arena, Riker invented the term 
“heresthetic[,]” stating: 
“Heresthetic” is a word I coined from a Greek root for choosing and 
deciding, and I use it to describe the art of setting up situations–
composing the alternatives among which political actors must choose–
in such a way that even those who do not wish to do so are compelled 
by the structure of the situation to support the heresthetician’s 
purpose. 
Id. 
64 WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION x (1986).  Riker states: 
the traditional liberal arts of language are logic, rhetoric, and grammar 
. . . Logic is concerned with the truth-value of sentences.  Grammar is 
concerned with the communication-value of sentences.  Rhetoric is 
concerned with the persuasion value of sentences.  And heresthetic is 
concerned with the strategy-value of sentences.  In each case, the art 
involves the use of language to accomplish some purpose: to arrive at 
truth, to communicate, to persuade, and to manipulate. 
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reformers strategize to obscure the truth by manipulating the game, by 
moving the battle from the court of law to the court of public opinion.  
This is the essence of tort reform by stealth. 
The late William H. Riker, in many of his last writings, including his 
posthumously published The Strategy of Rhetoric, observes that “[t]he line 
between heresthetic (manipulation) and rhetoric (persuasion) is wavy 
and uncertain . . .”65  In conducting studies of communications in 
political campaigns, he concludes that “heresthetic and rhetoric are 
inseparably linked and must be analyzed together.”66  Contemporary 
tort reformers have masterfully maneuvered much of the reform debate 
to the political arena, discrediting the common law along the way.  They 
have endeavored to re-shape public perception and the way the 
American public conceives justice.  Law and society scholars have 
debunked the claims of the contemporary tort reformers.  However, the 
attack on our civil justice system persists.  The attack must be examined 
from a political perspective in order to distill perception from reality.  
Today’s reformers strategically rely on the heresthetic to ensure that 
their view–and only their view–gets a hearing, bypassing the due 
process safeguards in place in the law courts. 
A. The Ethos of Stealth Tort Reform 
1. Crisis Labeling and Fear Mongering 
[I]n a political context the content of the talk seems to be 
irrelevant, as is its logic and its responsiveness to issues 
and questions.  It is as though any verbal display, 
especially if it is delivered with style and flair, 
encourages audiences to believe in the speaker’s 
competence and in his or her likelihood to deal with 
governmental issues in ways that benefit the audience.  
An occasional memorable or quotable phrase seems to 
be more persuasive that an argument that is empirically 
and logically impeccable and thorough.67 
The contemporary “torts crisis” evolved not through empirically and 
logically impeccable arguments responsive to issues and questions, but 
as a result of reformers manipulating the public mood through strategic 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
65 RIKER, supra note 54, at 9. 
66 Id. at 10. 
67 MURRAY EDELMAN, THE POLITICS OF MISINFORMATION 97 (2001). 
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use of the media financed by business interests.68  Advertising strategies 
designed to influence the public mood were built around the 
“memorable phrase[,]” utilizing appeals to passion through advertising 
devises directed to ensuring that only one side of the question got a 
hearing.69  Manufacturers whose liability insurance premiums suddenly 
soared,70 invoked the threat of danger and characterized the perceived 
problem as a “products liability crisis.”71  Hand-picked reports designed 
to show just one side of the story (“out of control” claims in which 
plaintiffs won large verdicts for seemingly small or nonexistent wrongs) 
produced positive results for their industry sponsors.  Commentators 
soon noted that a “tort explosion” was undermining Corporate 
America.72  The crisis label rhetorically mandated a call to action, forcing 
the public to align without question.  It spread rapidly beyond products 
liability until a full-blown “torts crisis” was perceived.73  Advocates of 
this mentality eventually succeeded in vesting the very term “tort 
reform” with a politically useful, if skewed, meaning.74 
The labeling of the situation as a “crisis” is yet another example of 
the heresthetic in which the structure of the argument compels “even 
those who do not wish to do so. . . to support the heresthetician’s 
purpose.”75  Indeed, the very term “crisis” invokes a threat that the 
public must rally around and face together.  “More powerfully, perhaps, 
than any other political term, it suggests a need for unity and for 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION, 
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY 194 (2000) (noting a strategic shift among business interests 
and stating, when it comes to unifying issues like tort reform, the most effective strategy 
involves shaping “public mood”). 
69 See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 6, at 39-46. 
70 See VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 269 (commenting on plausible explanations for the 
“insurance crisis” such as “increases in legitimate malpractice claims or bad economic 
forecasting by liability insurers that forced them to raise insurance rates”); Jay Angoff, 
Falling Claims and Rising Premiums in the Medical Malpractice Insurance Industry, 
http://www.centerjd.org/ANGOFFReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2007) (documenting a 
correlation between poor industry investments and increasing med-mal premiums). 
71 See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 49 (documenting the media coverage of 
the “insurance or liability crisis” reported as “a new national crisis.”) (citations omitted). 
72 Id. at 47 (documenting the use of the term “litigation explosion” in the media 
beginning in the mid 1980s and chosen as the title for Walter Olson’s book). 
73 Id. at 49. 
74 Id. at 651. 
75 RIKER, supra note 54, at 9. 
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common sacrifice.”76  Such crisis labeling is a rhetorical tactic utilized for 
political blame shifting:77 
By calling a situation a crisis, and by identifying certain 
causes, the labeler can disavow responsibility for its 
occurrence and mask the true recurring nature of the so-
called unique phenomenon.  With respect to the 
insurance crisis, the problem may be rooted in the 
industry’s boom and bust cycle.  By labeling the 
situation a crisis, however, the critics focus the debate on 
causes outside the industry itself. 78 
In response to the rhetorically created crisis, the reformers garner public 
support in debating how to best engage in “crisis management.”79 
Playing on public fears of ever-elevating medical costs, the reformers 
turned to the issue of medical malpractice insurance, inciting fear that a 
rash of lawsuits would leave Americans without access to doctors or life-
saving products.80  The reformers chose their rhetoric carefully; labels 
like “litigation mentality” and “lawsuit lottery” have considerable 
salience for Americans who value self sufficiency, calling for a return to 
the days of personal responsibility where the public is cautioned to 
refrain from filing lawsuits.81 
A Newsweek cover story captures the rhetorical fear-mongering tactic 
wherein it warned, “Doctors. Teachers. Coaches. Ministers.  They all 
                                                 
76 MURRAY EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE, WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT 
FAIL 45 (1977). 
77 Id. at 45-47. 
78 See Daniels, supra note 56, at 276. 
79 EDELMAN, supra note 76, at 47 (stating that in response to a semantically created crisis, 
“crisis management” is a way to build public support). 
80 See Bruce A. Finzen & Brooke B. Tassoni, Regulation of Consumer Products: Myth, Reality 
and the Media, 11 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 524 (2002).  Finzen and Tassoni state: 
[The reformers] have endeavored to sell the public on the notion that 
the legal system has been overtaken by money-grubbing trial lawyers 
who manipulate junk science to demonize life-saving drugs and 
destroy the companies that make them.- They have also attempted to 
sell the public on the idea that a litigation explosion threatens to 
bankrupt the innocent, deprive the world of life-saving products, and 
line the pockets of plaintiffs’ lawyers with ill-gotten gains.- To sell the 
public on the idea that immediate reform must take place before 
society pays too great a price. 
Id. 
81 See Daniel J. Page, The All American Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998 
(advertisement). 
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share a common fear: being sued on the job.  Our litigation nation—and 
a plan to fix it”82  The article claimed that the country is suffering from 
an “onslaught of litigation” and featured tales in support of its claim that 
America’s desire to “win a jackpot from a system that allows 
sympathetic juries to award plaintiffs not just real damages . . . but 
millions more for the impossible-to-measure ‘pain and suffering’ and 
highly arbitrary ‘punitive damages.’”83  While a tremendous amount of 
empirical study contradicts many of the claims of the “crisis[,]”84 none of 
it was included in the Times or Newsweek stories.  The graphic cover story 
appealing to fear and common sense simply illustrates the obvious, and 
the perception that follows is that, “[a]s a result of such dire 
consequences, the civil justice system needs change and people should, 
indeed must, support those changes.”85  It is not just the reformers that 
suffer from the crisis, but, as the insurance industry public relations 
campaign claims, “‘we all pay the price.’”86  This crisis-labeling is a 
symbolic and emotionally charged appeal to unexamined assumptions, 
and empirical data is not likely to defeat such claims.87  As Walter Olson, 
author of The Litigation Explosion,88 related in response to criticism that 
evidence of a litigation explosion was lacking–it’s the stories that really 
matter, not the empirical data.89 
2. Myths, Urban Legends, and the Demons: Lawyers, Victims, and 
Juries 
Media mogul, Steven Brill, first wrote about litigation myths in the 
media as early as 1986.  He researched the archives of stories appearing 
in Time, The Economist, Forbes, and the television show 60 Minutes and 
found that many of the stories presented in support of what newscaster 
Harry Reasoner called a “litigation binge[,]” were simply urban 
                                                 
82 See Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003. 
83 Id. 
84 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
85 Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Between People’s Ears:”  
Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 454 (2000). 
86 Mencimer, supra note 10, at 18; see also We All Pay the Price: An Industry Effort to Reform 
Civil Justice, 47 INS. REV. 58 (1986). 
87 See Common Sense as a Cultural System, in CLIFFORD GERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: 
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 75 (1983) (stating that a common sense 
argument “rests its [case] on the assertion that it is not a case at all . . . . The world is its 
authority”). 
88 WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA 
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991) (targeting lawyers as responsible for a litigation explosion). 
89 Diane Gale Cox, Tort Tales Lash Back, 14 NAT’L L. J. no. 48, Aug. 3, 1992,  at 37. 
Gavin: Stealth Tort Reform
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
448 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
legends.90  However, these legends, whether fabrication or distortion of 
truth, mislead the public into thinking that they are representative of a 
class of cases, that they are typical cases, when in fact they may be 
aberrations.91  These stories take on a life of their own and catch on 
precisely because of their heresthetic appeal.  Anthropologist and law 
professor, Robert Hayden, has hypothesized that such anecdotes 
persuade because they portray a threat important to the American 
cultural value of personal responsibility and tort reformers have utilized 
such assertive rhetoric to appeal to this moral value.92  Urban legends 
combine the moral imperative with dramatic examples that are easy to 
comprehend.93  Thus, contemporary reformers draw on American 
cultural norms and ideals, on what political scientist Deborah Stone calls 
“motherhood issues[,]” issues that everyone supports when they are 
stated abstractly.94  Urban legends serve as symbolic appeals to prejudice 
and unexamined assumptions.  The tales are simply common sense 
illustrations of the obvious; if you believe in common sense, they must 
be true.95  In the words of F. G. Bailey describing assertive rhetoric, “they 
assert truths that they present as inescapable, defying argument, so 
essentially true that they are beyond the need for corroborating 
evidence.”96  The legends become fact and, as Bailey states, “[i]n rhetoric, 
to proclaim something a fact is to tell the audience that they have no 
alternative other that to give their assent, on pain of being excluded as 
crazy people.”97 
By the mid-1990s, reform rhetoric began to sway public opinion in a 
broader way by demonizing the personal injury trial lawyer.98  The 
rhetoric accused lawyers of everything from stirring up “[f]alse 
[i]llness[es]”99 to attempting to “bypass . . . democracy.”100  
                                                 
90 See generally Steven Brill & James Lyons, The Not So Simple Crisis, N.J. L.J., May 15, 
1986, at 1. 
91 Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation 
System–And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992). 
92 See Robert M. Hayden, Neocontract Polemics and Unconscionable Scholarship, 24 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 863 (1990). 
93 DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3, at 44 (recounting many of the urban legends such as 
the “The Pinto and the Horse,” “The Ladder in the Manure,” “The Drunk in the Phone 
Booth,” and “The Fat Man and the Lawnmower.”). 
94 Deborah Stone, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 12 (1997). 
95 See Gertz, supra note 87. 
96 BAILEY, supra note 57, at 125. 
97 Id. at 132. 
98 See generally OLSON, supra note 8; BAILEY, supra note 57, at 139 (noting that assertive 
rhetoric “tends to focus on persons rather than just on deeds”). 
99 Michael Fumento, How the Media and Lawyers Stir Up False Illness, 
http://www.fumento.com/illness.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
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Contemporary reformers claim that “[p]ersonal injury lawsuits and other 
tort claims represent a $40 billion per year industry built upon the abuse 
and misuse of America’s legal system by contingency-fee lawyers.”101  By 
putting a personal face on the fear-mongering claims, those making the 
claims attach blame to the actor, encouraging the audience to make a 
judgment about the character of those doing the deed (the lawyers filing 
the lawsuits), rather than allowing the facts to speak for themselves. 102 
This rhetoric of assertion is promoting a return to a traditional 
contract and negligence-based products liability system.  The movement 
seeks to return the burden of accidental injuries caused by products to 
the consumer, insulating those who market them from liability–a 
repudiation of the doctrinal theory fueling the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts and theories supporting post-Restatement expansion.103  Unlike the 
common law process out of which the original reform evolved, this 
political movement, by its very nature, does not invite discussion.  A 
return to the moral imperative of individual responsibility is touted 
today by reformers seeking pro-business legislation.  However, the 
rhetoric presents only one side of the issue and fails to address either 
product safety or business accountability: 
By publicizing all the horrors of the tort system, they 
[the reformers] get a lot done. . . . You pass legislation 
that curbs their liability–that’s the ultimate prize.  But 
short of that, you affect juries, you affect elected officials, 
you affect judges, you affect the entire discourse of the 
United States.104 
The success of the reform movement lies in the mindset of the judiciary 
and the public at large; however, much of the public at large no longer 
                                                                                                             
100 Walter K. Olson, Plaintiffs Lawyers Take Aim at Democracy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at 
A26. 
101 Institute for Legal Reform, Trial Lawyers’ Influence, www.instituteforlegalreform.com/ 
issues/issue.cfm?issue=TLI (last visited Aug. 10, 2007). 
102 See BAILEY, supra note 57, at 139-40. 
103 See John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a “New 
Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects–A Survey of the States Reveals a 
Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 507 (1996) (for an in depth discussion of the 
American Law Institute’s movement from “[p]ro -consumer to [p]ro- manufacturer’” as 
embodied in the drafting of Restatement (Third) of Torts, despite its lack of consensus at 
common law). 
104 See Dan Zegart, The Right Wing’s Drive for ‘Tort Reform’, THE NATION, Oct. 25, 2004, at 
18 (quoting Pamela Gilbert, a lobbyist for plaintiff’s lawyers). 
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remembers the policies that drove our legal system to implement the 
original Restatement. 
IV.  JURIES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Our common law legal system is based on principles and the rule of 
law.  While formal legal rules define the causes of action and the legal 
procedures, the broader common law is shaped by the attitudes the 
jurors bring with them, not only when deciding an individual case, but 
also on future cases: “By casting its shadow over the negotiation and 
settlement process, the jury influences the actions of present and future 
litigants and their attorneys.”105  The result may be a manipulation of our 
underlying cultural assumptions or what anthropologist Robert Hayden 
calls our “common sense” concerning our civil justice system and how it 
works.106  The rhetorical threats to the American democratic way of life 
“may have affected potential jurors, who are, after all, consumers.  The 
publicity may have influenced their decisions about damage awards for 
many years to come.”107 
Further, jurors themselves are affected and influenced by assertive 
rhetoric,108 and the heresthetic appeal to personal responsibility may be 
depriving litigants of a fair impartial trial.109  One researcher labels this 
“jury shadows[;]”110 another explains that, “[d]eliberating in the 
shadows . . . jurors often viewed themselves as responsible for returning 
                                                 
105 Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors’ Judgments of Business Liability in Tort 
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 85, 111 (1992). 
106 See Robert Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony and 
the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, Inst. For Legal Studies, Working Papers 
Series 9 (1989). 
107 Edith Greene et al., Jurors’ Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 
40 AM. U. L. REV. 805, 808 (1990). 
108 See Hans & Lofquist, supra note 105, at 111-12 (finding this additional aspect of jury 
shadows in their study).  Hans states: 
Jurors themselves are affected and influenced by other juries’ decisions 
in a number of ways.  The jurors we interviewed appeared to be quite 
cognizant of other civil juries, real and apocryphal.  Their concerns 
about deep pockets, the litigation crisis, and the integrity of plaintiffs 
were implicitly and explicitly linked to the presumed excesses of 
antecedent juries. 
Id. 
109 See, e.g., Eugene Pavalon, The Insurance Industry: Do Its Ads Undermine Jury Impartiality, 
75 A.B.A. J. 46 (1989) (reporting on Aetna Life & Casualty’s ad campaign on the subject of 
law suit abuse). 
110 See generally Marc Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury System and the 
“Litigation Explosion, in MORRIS S. ARNOLD ET AL., THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY (1987) 
(describing this facet of what he terms “jury shadows”). 
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moderation and good judgment to the civil justice system.”111  Stealth 
tort reform through manipulation of juror attitudes may have greater 
impact on our civil justice system than implementation of formal reform 
measures.112  The victim of this publicity may be our civil justice system 
and a plaintiff’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to a fair and impartial 
jury trial—tantamount to jury tampering wherein juries are conditioned 
to sympathize with one class of individuals.113  In fact, there is data 
supporting a thesis that the multi-million dollar rhetorical “crisis” aimed 
at manipulating public opinion has prejudiced juries against plaintiffs 
and has produced an observed pro-defendant trend.114 
Neil Vidmar conducted a comprehensive study of the civil jury in 
medical tort cases, concluding: 
The widespread criticism of juries in medical negligence 
cases appears to be based on anecdotes and on findings 
fromseveral studies of jury verdicts.  The data from the 
studies do not allow the conclusions that have been 
drawn from them because very plausible alternative 
hypotheses that could explain the results cannot be 
ruled out.  The methodological critique I have offered 
does not allow the inference that juries are doing a good 
job; it only says that the evidence does not allow us to 
say one way or the other.115 
                                                 
111 Hans & Lofquist, supra note 105, at 112. 
112 Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The 
Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1802 (2002). 
113 See, e.g., VIDMAR, supra note 1 (and accompanying text); Pavalon, supra note 109 
(commenting on the effect of media campaigns on jury impartiality); Philip G. Peters, Jr.,  
Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1484 (2007) (concluding that data show that juries 
consistently sympathize more with doctors who are sued that patients who sue). 
114 See Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 8, at 739.  Eisenberg and Henderson state: 
The combination of dramatic increases in insurance rates [in the 1980s], 
widespread reporting of the insurance crisis, a multimillion dollar 
publicity campaign to link the insurance crisis to products liability 
rules, and such rules’ effects on daily life, may have created the kind of 
massive, widespread shift in attitude needed to produce the observed 
pro-defendant trend. 
Id. 
115 VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 226.  Vidmar’s purpose was “to empirically examine the 
merits of the claims that malpractice juries deviate extensively from medical standards and 
that they are a primary culprit behind the ills that plague the American health care 
system.”  Id. at 265. 
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While Vidmar urges caution in extrapolating his finding about 
malpractice juries to others such as products liability,116 he states 
emphatically that his findings should raise very serious questions about 
the reformers basic assumptions of jury behavior as well as their broad 
indictments of products liability juries.117  In the same year Vidmar’s 
study was published, Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin published their 
study of juries based on data drawn from civil products liability and 
medical malpractice juries from different parts of the country.  Daniels 
and Martin concluded, “We—and others—do not find empirical 
evidence of a system run amok with skyrocketing awards, and so on.  
Or, we find little or no empirical information available regarding many 
of the claims made by the reformers about juries and the civil justice 
system.”118 
V.  VICTIMS AND LAWYERS 
Contemporary tort reform rhetoric not only covertly threatens the 
right to an impartial fact finder in the jury box but may significantly 
restrict access to the civil justice system and may affect the size of the 
pool of lawyers willing to take on the injured consumer’s case.  Jury 
researchers Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, in a study of the market 
effects of contemporary tort reform in Texas on legal practice, note, 
“changes in jury verdicts–real or perceived–reverberate throughout the 
civil litigation process because they help set the ‘going rate’ for settling 
claims.”119  The perceived jury attitude in turn affects the economic 
realities of private civil practice and, concomitantly, access to legal 
representation.  Because plaintiffs’ attorneys are the civil justice system’s 
“gatekeepers[,]” their perceptions have a significant influence on the 
civil justice system.120  In their study, Daniels and Martin detail plaintiff 
lawyers’ perceptions of changes in the legal environment and separately 
assess the perceived effect of “formal legal changes”121 and of the “tort 
reform public relations campaigns.”122  The study concludes: 
                                                 
116 Id. at 274. 
117 Id. at 273; see also Daniels & Martin, supra note 85, at 456-82 (detailing the effects of tort 
reform on jury attitudes and awards). 
118 DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 3, at ix-x. 
119 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 112 (conclusions drawn from ninety-six in-depth 
interviews and 554 survey responses of plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas). 
120 See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fees Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil 
Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997). 
121 Daniels & Martin, supra note 112, at 1797. 
122 Id. at 1802-03, Table 6a, Table 6b. 
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Interestingly, rather than changes in formal law, it is 
events which affect the broader legal environment that 
seem to have the greatest impact on plaintiffs’ practices. 
. . . [T]he tort reform public relations campaign and the 
decisions of the Texas Supreme Court are perceived as 
having the greatest negative influence on plaintiffs’ 
lawyers’ practices, much more so than any . . . specific, 
formal legal changes . . . The state supreme court and the 
public relations campaigns impact the everyday 
working environment, in lawyers’ eyes, by affecting the 
jury or the jury pool.  Perceptions about juries and jury 
behavior are central to the way plaintiffs’ lawyers 
perceive their working environment and construct their 
practices . . . . The public relations campaigns that have 
touted tort reform are seen as especially pernicious 
because of their supposed direct effect on the jury 
pool . . . and creating massive misinformation.123 
The perception of the gatekeeper to the civil justice system may play 
a greater role in shaping our civil justice system than any formal legal 
reform.  This perception will determine whether, and for whom, the law 
will work in practice.124  It is the perceptions that rule: in the aftermath of 
three decades of assertive rhetoric, public opinion is under the 
perception that there is a tort litigation crisis and perception is 
manipulating access to legal process.  Truth is irrelevant. 
VI.  THE JUDICIARY 
A pro-defendant “quiet revolution” taking place in the courts was 
documented by Professors Henderson and Eisenberg based on product 
liability claims filed in 1990.  Henderson and Eisenberg demonstrated 
that courts had begun to reject–or at least resist expansion of many of the 
doctrines underlying the “original tort reform.”125  Since that study, the 
judiciary continues to waiver on its commitment to original doctrinal 
underpinnings of products liability law.  The judiciary is not immune to 
the forces shaping public opinion and the electorate.  However, there are 
signs that the judiciary is retreating from its commitment to promoting 
                                                 
123 Id. at 1802. 
124 Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “It’s Darwinism—Survival of the Fittest:”  How 
Markets and Reputations Shape the Way in Which Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Obtain Clients, 21 J. L. & 
POL’Y 377 (1999). 
125 See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 793. 
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safety through enforcement and/or expansion of products liability 
doctrine. 
The first and foremost change in attitude emanated from the court 
where it all began, the California Supreme Court,126 signaling a 
significant retreat from Justice Traynor’s original thesis as expressed in 
Escola and Greenman.127  In Brown,128 a 1988 drug case, and in Anderson,129 
a 1991 asbestos case, the court referenced the rhetoric of the defendants 
and made an about face on the “deterrence issue,” or from the point of 
view of the reformers, “overdeterrence.”130  The California court, once at 
the forefront of developing consumer protection law, adopted a liability 
standard more favorable to defendants than most other states.131  While 
only a small minority of jurisdictions exempt all prescription drugs from 
liability,132 the fact that the California Supreme Court is leading the roll-
back foreshadows a not-so-subtle change in judicial commitment to the 
safety enhancing doctrine underlying the “original tort reform.” 
In Brown, the California Supreme Court held that strict liability 
would be inapplicable to all prescription drug failure to warn claims, 
reasoning that the holding was necessary on public policy grounds in 
order to avoid deterring drug manufacturers from developing and 
marketing new drugs and to foster reasonably priced prescription drugs.  
The court surmised that “if” drug manufacturers could not count on 
limiting their liability to risks that were known or knowable at the time 
of manufacture or distribution, they “might” be discouraged from 
                                                 
126 Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972) (illustrating California’s 
tradition of being on the cutting-edge of products liability doctrine expanding consumer 
rights); Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (same); see also Sindell v. Abbott 
Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (in which California became 
the first court to recognize market share liability). 
127 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963). 
128 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). 
129 Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991). 
130 See generally Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L. 
REV. 303, 314 (1992) (for a discussion of reformers complaint of “overdeterrence” by a 
product liability system which is thwarting research and development of products and 
driving products off the market). 
131 See Castrignano v. E. R. Squibb & Sons. Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988) (rejecting Brown 
and illustrating that most courts deal with strict liability and prescription drugs on a case-
by-case basis); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987) (same); White v. Wyeth 
Lab., 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988) (same); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 
(D. Minn. 1988) (same); Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 97 N.J. 429 (1984) (same).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
132 See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 470; Lindsey v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 
1980) (applying New York law); Mckee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Terhune v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975) (Wash. 1978). 
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developing new and improved products.133  In support of these 
conjectures, the court relied on defendants’ rhetorical citing of a “host of 
examples of products which have greatly increased in price or have been 
withdrawn or withheld from the market because of the fear that their 
producers would be held liable for large judgments.”134  Significantly, 
the court also noted that the deterrence of strict liability with regard to 
prescription drugs was unnecessary and inappropriate because the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) plays a large role in screening new 
drugs before they are placed on the market,135 despite the realities of 
today’s FDA’s drug and medical device approval process.136 
In Anderson, an asbestos case, Justice Mosk, the California Supreme 
Court Justice who authored the opinion in Brown, wrote separately to 
criticize the majority’s reliance on Brown in extending its rule to non-
prescription drug products, stating that the majority stretched the 
holding and analysis in Brown beyond all recognition when it relied on 
Brown in the asbestos litigation involving products other than 
prescription drugs.  Significantly, Justice Mosk warned, “I must express 
my apprehension, however, that we are once again retreating from ‘[t]he 
pure concepts of product liability so pridefully fashioned and nurtured 
by this court.’”137  However, despite Justice Mosk’s apprehension in 
                                                 
133 Brown, 751 P.2d. at 479. 
134 Id. at 479-80 (relying on E.R. Squibb & Sons’s claims that Benedectin was withdrawn 
from the market in 1983 because of the cost of insurance; that in the mid-1980s a producer 
of the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine withdrew its product from the market 
due to liability exposure and difficulty in continuing to obtain insurance; that 
unavailability of insurance prevented a manufacturer from marketing a new drug to treat 
vision problems).  But see Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade 
Performance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, 
INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 127-49 (Peter H. Scheck ed., 1991) (reporting that 
the so called tort tax, even without factoring the benefits of promoting safety, is, at most, 
two percent). 
135 See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 483 n.12 (citing Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 
1980)); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (affording FDA approved 
prescription drugs immunity from strict liability). 
136 See, e.g., Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right 
Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 530 (1988) 
(“Virtually all observers, including medical device manufacturers, share the view that the 
FDA’s resources are inadequate to meet its obligations under the Medical Device 
Amendments.”) (citations omitted); Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470-80 (1996) 
(commenting on inadequate resources in the FDA). 
137 See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 561 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, 
J., concurring and dissenting).  But see Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Cal. 
1996) (five years later Judge Mosk wrote for the majority in a divided opinion rejecting 
defendants assertions that the standard for failure to warn involving prescription drugs is 
simple negligence). 
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applying Brown’s public policy rationale specific to prescription drugs, 
later courts extended it to products such as inflatable penile implants, 
prosthetic heart devices, and Intrauterine Devices (“IUDs”).138 
The California turnaround139 is perhaps the clearest example of a 
court’s willingness to accept the rhetoric of the reformers by reigning in 
products liability law based on unexamined empirical claims.  However, 
the unexamined public policy rhetoric of “overdeterrence” is seeping 
into other court opinions.140  For instance, the Utah Supreme Court relied 
on the public policy considerations of Brown in granting immunity from 
strict liability design defect claims to all prescription drugs approved by 
the FDA.141  The court granted the manufacturers immunity despite that 
fact that “not a shred of evidence has been presented to this Court that 
indicates that liability under the tort system has deterred pharmaceutical 
companies from introducing new drugs.”142 
Explanations for this changing judicial attitude may be a reflection of 
the change in public opinion; after all, judges as well as jurors and 
lawyers are part of the public at large influenced by the relentless 
assertive rhetoric of the past three decades.  Alternatively, in states like 
California, where the judiciary is elected by a public bombarded with the 
rhetoric of the past three decades, it may be yet an additional example of 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (applying the 
public policy rationale of Brown to an inflatable penile implant); Plenger v. ALZA Corp., 13 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 811,  818 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that, on policy grounds, no distinctions 
between prescription drugs and implanted drugs and IUDs existed); Stangvik v. Shiley 
Inc., 273 Cal. Rptr. 179, 190 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“Although Brown dealt with the 
manufacture of prescription drugs, the policy may also be applied in the case of 
manufacturers of advanced medical innovations”). 
139 See Bill Blum, Toward a Radical Middle: Has a Great Court Become Mediocre?, 77 A.B.A. J. 
48 (1991) (citing California Supreme Court cases declining to expand plaintiffs’ tort claims). 
140 See, e.g., Young for Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59 (Wash. 1996) (adopting the 
reasoning of Brown, holding that when the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe product 
fails to warn of its inherent defects, Comment k to Section 406A in Restatement (Second) 
Torts imposes liability for negligence only, not strict liability); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 
813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) (adopting a rule similar to Brown immunizing prescription 
drugs from strict liability design claims, but only if approved by the FDA); Enright v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991) (citing Brown’s public policy favoring some 
protection for prescription drugs); Shackil v. Lederle Labs, 561 A.2d 511, 512 (N.J. 1989) 
(rejecting collective liability theory in claim based on defective design of DPT vaccine 
holding that it “would frustrate overarching public-policy . . . by threatening the continued 
availability of needed drugs and impairing the prospects of the development of safer 
vaccines.”). 
141 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95. 
142 Id. at 102-03 (Howe, J. dissenting). 
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the insidious nature of stealth tort reform manipulating the public 
today.143 
Public opinion is a construction of governments, of the media, and of 
everyday conversation influenced by governments and the media, 
although it is often accepted as if it were objective reality.144  The 
judiciary must be circumspect in making policy decisions based on 
rhetorical reality.  The judiciary must demand more than assertive 
rhetoric as a basis for retreating from its traditional commitment to 
promote public safety through enforcement of products liability law 
doctrine.145 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Stealth tort reform is changing our perceptions of the civil justice 
system in twenty-first century America, and contemporary reformers 
have masterfully conducted a political public relations campaign which 
begs the question, and is directed to ensuring, that only one side of the 
question gets a hearing.146  While it is tempting to challenge the rhetoric 
by debating whether its claims are legitimate,147 political scientists 
caution that questioning an argument’s form is inappropriate and they 
urge that the proper question to ask about assertive rhetoric concerns its 
“effectiveness.”148  If we accept this view point, it is difficult to argue that 
the contemporary tort reform movement is ineffective and, as noted 
earlier, the extensive empirical work of the law and society scholars has 
done little to counter public perception.  However, I posit that the legal 
question raised by stealth tort reform is not rhetorical.  Thus, the 
question for debate is whether the contemporary tort reform movement 
promotes the social values underlying product liability law.  Does it 
foster social justice? 
This complex inquiry needs further study.  On one hand, the 
reformers may be right; in the twenty-first century, perhaps we have 
returned to a culture privileging wealth maximization over individual 
                                                 
143 See OWEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 490 (noting that Brown was decided a few months 
after three liberal California justices were denied reelection and replaced by judges with 
more “moderate” views.). 
144 See generally EDELMAN, supra note 67, at 52. 
145 See generally Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of 
Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533 (1999) (urging courts to resist reforming the common law 
when applying tort reform legislation). 
146 BAILEY, supra note 57, at 124. 
147 See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text. 
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rights and the enterprise liability doctrine fueling the original tort reform 
is no longer relevant.  Although this explanation is beyond the scope of 
this Article, this thesis can be supported by the law and economic 
movement popular among tort scholars today, as well as erosion of strict 
liability doctrine embodied in the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Third) for products liability.149  However, if this is not the case, or at 
least has not been proven to be the case, the common law doctrine tells 
us that “the principle of fairness must have priority over the policy of 
wealth-maximization.”150 
The understanding of “fairness” in twenty-first century America 
must be debated in a common law context where all sides have an 
opportunity to be heard.  Unfortunately, it appears that much of the 
public, unschooled in the virtues of the common law process, accepts the 
perception that America is in a “crisis” due to lawsuit abuse, that greedy 
trial lawyers are playing a lawsuit lottery, that courts are clogged with 
frivolous tort cases, that huge jury awards are responsible for 
skyrocketing insurance premiums driving doctors out of business, 
closing down schools sports programs, scaring the clergy out of 
counseling their flocks, and even thwarting research and development of 
products that society desperately needs.  From these rhetorical 
assertions, it follows that the individual must take personal 
responsibility and that it is “unfair” to invoke tort law.  However, in 
fairness, should not the shield of moral responsibility be applied equally 
to defendants’ injury causing behaviors?  Should fairness to victims be at 
least as important as fairness to defendants, or have we as a society 
changed so dramatically that the doctrine of Escola and Greenman151 is no 
longer relevant? 
What about product safety?  In an age where federal regulatory 
agencies are unable to protect consumers from sophisticated products 
and corporate misconduct152 and where consumers injured by products 
                                                 
149 See John Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.I. Erode Strict Liability in the Restatement 
(Third) for Products Liability?, 10 TOURO L. REV. 21 (1993). 
150 See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1380 n.257 (1997) (citations omitted); Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 103 (Howe, 
J. dissenting) (wherein Judge Howe, after noting the lack of evidence in support of 
defendants’ over-deterrence argument, which the majority relied upon, asks, “[w]hy 
should those who are seriously injured or suffer because of the death of another have to 
stand the expense of such losses to support the high profit margins of the drug industry?”). 
151 See supra notes 12-40 and accompanying text. 
152 See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FINAL REP. 
11, supra note 136; BOGUS, supra note  8, at 150-51 (remarking that while asbestos causes 
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can no longer rely on federal or state health care because greater and 
greater percentages of the population are uninsured or underinsured,153 
is it fair for injured consumers to assume the costs of injury from 
products sold for profit in the marketplace?  Are the social goals of 
promoting safe products less important than when the original tort 
reform evolved under the watchful guise of the common law?  Do we 
now privilege the market place over social responsibility? 
Under the common law, facts become “truth” only through the filter 
of the rule of law and upon application of the rules of evidence subject to 
rigorous cross examination designed to expose hyperbole, bias, and 
outright untruth.154  The “original tort reform” developed at common 
law, its foundation grounded in legal theory, however imperfect, 
evolved primarily to protect consumers from injuries caused by unsafe 
products, regardless of how the theorists would define “unsafe.”155  
While judges and jurors are the voice of the common law, the voice of 
public opinion is “largely created by those who already wield the 
greatest power and is then used to rationalize their actions.”156  Today’s 
pro-defendant tort reform is a product of the common law’s antithesis 
with its foundation in assertive rhetoric–the heresthetic.  It is a product 
of political manipulation.  It is what Professor Feinman calls, “Politics by 
[o]ther [m]eans.”157  It is clear that much of today’s “truth” about 
products liability reform is a response to a semantically created political 
crisis; it is a result of a war of words taking place in the media rather 
than the courts.  Its foundation is in impassioned rhetoric, often funded 
by the very constituents seeking to profit from its agenda.  The real 
question concerning stealth tort reform is not simply whether the 
contemporary movement fosters social justice, but whether stealth tort 
reform has covertly manipulated perceptions of what is socially just. 
                                                                                                             
170,000 deaths from lung cancer, the EPA was never able to ban it.  Lawsuits forced it from 
the market). 
153 Underinsured in America: Is Health Coverage Adequate?, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID 
AND THE UNINSURED (2002) (“researchers estimate that about a fifth of insured individuals 
are underinsured”); FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 194 (commenting on decreasing forms of 
government protection, including health care). 
154 See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 1 (2002) (“We want juries to return the right 
verdict, and by that we may mean the truthful verdict, the one that accords with what 
happened.”). 
155 See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text. 
156 EDELMAN, supra note 67, at 55. 
157 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 189. 
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